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Dwight D. Eisenhower, The National Security Council, and Dien Bien Phu
Abstract

“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” Dwight D. Eisenhower’s remarks at a conference on National
Defense in 1957 reflected the philosophy behind his national security system: his dedication to preparation
and proper planning. One of Eisenhower’s most regularly used, structured tools for proper planning was the
National Security Council (NSC). The Council was an organization comprised of high-ranking members of
government, chaired by the president, which was designed to provide the president with the information and
coordination needed to shape intelligent policy. The Council itself was not created by Eisenhower, but was
part of the National Security Act of 1947, along with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The Council’s stated goal was “to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for
the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.” The National
Security Act was flexible; it provided presidents with great discretion in operating the council. Eisenhower
crafted the NSC for his needs. In the words of Eisenhower’s first Special Assistant for National Security,
Robert Cutler, “Eisenhower wished the council mechanism made over into a valuable tool for his constant
use.”
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Dwight D. Eisenhower, The National Security Council,
and Dien Bien Phu
DAVID PUTNAM HADLEY
Gettysburg College

“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” 1 Dwight D. Eisenhower’s remarks at a
conference on National Defense in 1957 reflected the philosophy behind his national security
system: his dedication to preparation and proper planning. One of Eisenhower’s most regularly
used, structured tools for proper planning was the National Security Council (NSC). The Council
was an organization comprised of high-ranking members of government, chaired by the
president, which was designed to provide the president with the information and coordination
needed to shape intelligent policy. The Council itself was not created by Eisenhower, but was
part of the National Security Act of 1947, along with the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2 The Council’s stated goal was “to provide for the establishment of
integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the
Government relating to the national security.” 3 The National Security Act was flexible; it
provided presidents with great discretion in operating the council.4 Eisenhower crafted the NSC
for his needs. In the words of Eisenhower’s first Special Assistant for National Security, Robert
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Cutler, “Eisenhower wished the council mechanism made over into a valuable tool for his
constant use.” 5
Beginning with Fred Greenstein’s seminal The Hidden-Hand Presidency, which studied
Eisenhower’s leadership with a more critical eye, Eisenhower and his approach to governance
have been reappraised. The NSC is a key example. 6 Prior to the advent of Eisenhower
revisionism, Eisenhower’s NSC was often criticized, beginning with a Congressional
Commission initiated by Senator Henry Jackson in 1959. 7 This study criticized the NSC for
being too complex, a paper mill filled with vast numbers of pages of planning, all of which were,
in the Jackson committee’s view, compromised to the point of uselessness by ironing out
disagreement. Another major complaint was that the policy papers were useless in emergency
situations, as the Planning Board took too long to study and prepare them. 8 The NSC was seen as
being far too structured to deal with rapidly developing, changing threats. In his presidential
campaign in 1960, John F. Kennedy used this report to attack the “paper mill” of the NSC; he
explained in a letter to Jackson that he wanted to “simplify the operations of the national security
council.” 9 The NSC’s bureaucratic nature was also attacked for preventing proper
communication and cooperation among various departments. It was said that department
representatives were isolated in a group where there was no effective back-and-forth but rather
“agreement by exhaustion.” Eisenhower was also accused of using the NSC apparatus to deflect
5
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criticism from himself. 10 It is important to note, though, that these criticisms mainly came from
people outside the system. Those on the inside stress that Eisenhower was the ultimate decider of
issues, who demanded the representation of alternate points of view. Cutler explained that the
Council was, for Eisenhower, “a vital mechanism to assure that all sides of an issue would be
known by him before coming to his decision.” 11 Cutler stressed that “the Council’s role is
advisory. It makes recommendations to its statutory chairman, the President of the United States;
it does not decide.” 12
The issue raised by these opposing viewpoints on the Council ultimately focused upon
this question: was the NSC capable of flexibility, or was it a repressive organization that
squashed debate? It appeared upon reappraisal that despite the NSC’s formal structure, it allowed
a great deal of flexibility. The NSC provided a forum for multiple voices and multiple options,
giving not only advice to the president, but enabling participants to know the president’s and
each other’s viewpoints. 13 Eisenhower did not envision the NSC as his only source of
information or advice. Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower would establish such committees
or groups as he felt necessary to handle a particular problem. These groups were independent of
the NSC, but were capable of acting in cooperation, such as the Solarium Project which led to
the “New Look” in national security policy. Eisenhower would also regularly engage in informal
meetings with his subordinates, supplementing the formal procedures of his national security
mechanisms. He used these informal means to such an extent that some scholars have even
suggested that the NSC became essentially a façade during Eisenhower’s time in the White
10
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House. Amy Zegart, of UCLA, notes that “Eisenhower made organizational choices that gave
public preeminence to Cabinet-centered policy making [including forums such as the NSC] but
also worked behind the scenes to presidentialize, personalize, and centralize the system,”
suggesting that the token use of the NSC that would occur under Kennedy started with
Eisenhower. 14 However, these informal means were used in conjunction with the NSC, not at
the expense of the NSC. Creating an informal apparatus did not, simply by existing, undercut the
importance of the Council to presidential decision-making. The National Security Council of
Dwight D. Eisenhower was designed to provide the president with the best advice available, and
therefore exercised an influential role in the Eisenhower White House. The discussions in the
Council and the recommendations made, however, were part of a larger structure mixing formal
and informal processes in determining national security policy.
Perhaps the best way to understand the NSC and Eisenhower’s use of it in conjunction
with other avenues of advice is in specific examples. An especially important and relevant one is
the decision that faced the Council in March and April of 1954, concerning the besieged French
forces at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina. France’s war in Indochina was a situation Eisenhower had
inherited from the Truman administration. The ultimate decision not to intervene, but to continue
supporting elements in Vietnam and the other Indochinese states, would affect the U.S. for years
to come. The decision came at a relatively early period in Eisenhower’s presidency, when the
operation of the NSC and its machinery were relatively new since the various members were
settling into their roles. Examination of the decisions regarding Dien Bien Phu thus provides
insight into the eternal questions of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It also illuminates the early,
formative stages of a body which played a key role in policy during the Eisenhower
14
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administration years and how that body acted in concert with other elements of Eisenhower’s
leadership.
Part I
Before grappling with a specific case, it is best to examine what Eisenhower’s NSC was
intended to be, and who had a hand in making it that way. First, how was the Eisenhower NSC
impacted by the prior administration? The first suggestions of an organization like the NSC
appear in a report in 1945 to the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, from Ferdinand
Eberstadt, a policy advisor working in the War Production Board. In the letter Eberstadt
discusses, among other things, the need for a coordinating body. This suggestion would
eventually gestate into the NSC in 1947. Under the Truman administration, the NSC was used on
an occasional basis. 15 Truman participated sporadically in the Council after its inception,
attending eleven of the almost sixty meetings held before the outbreak of the Korean War.
Initially, meetings were held every two weeks, but became more uneven as time went by. The
Council also increased in size. Though Truman began to use the Council apparatus more once
the Korean War broke out, it retained its role of being an adjutant to proceedings, rather than a
place where policy was formulated. 16 The NSC at this time lacked its own formal staff, but it did
form an ancillary body in the Psychological Coordinating Board, to separate and discuss the
large numbers of psychological operations proposed to be carried out against Cold War targets.
Proposed in December of 1947, it began producing papers in September of 1948. 17 When
evaluating the Council, Eisenhower and his subordinates recognized some useful ideas. As
15
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Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman noted in their study of Eisenhower’s system, “Eisenhower
intended to modify and improve upon Truman’s foundation, not obliterate it.”18
The Eisenhower National Security Council came from Eisenhower’s respect for the need
of reliable intelligence and reliable processing of that intelligence in decision-making. As one
NSC member explained, “An integral and in fact basic element in the formation of national
security policy is the latest and best intelligence bearing on the substance of the policy to be
determined.” 19 Once the Eisenhower administration entered the White House, the Council took
steps that resulted in the adoption of “uniform and customary procedure,” in which there were
two to three hour meetings held most frequently on Thursday, with formal planning papers
discussed; each of which had a financial appendices for any policy costs, an opening CIA brief
given by CIA Director Allen Dulles, and minimum attendance for vigorous discussion. 20 The
National Security Act of 1947 put fixed membership at the President, the Vice-President, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. 21 Eisenhower added the Director of the Office
of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and regularly invited the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Budget Director. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the CIA Director were also present as
advisors, as were any officials who were needed for a particular order of business, such as the
Attorney General or the Chairman of the Atomic energy commission. 22 At the heart of this
grouping was Eisenhower’s desire for information to be more available; he wanted the
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information at his disposal and at the disposal of the people most directly related to carrying out
national security.
The Eisenhower NSC did away with the Psychological Operations Board, and created
two ancillary organizations, the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. Also
new was the position of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The assistant determined
the Council’s agenda, briefed the President, and supervised the operations of the Council and
NSC staff, and coordinated the various people and departments involved. All the people involved
in the NSC were, by Eisenhower’s logic, expanding their own knowledge and ability, and not
just informing him. Eisenhower, “always insisted that government cannot function properly if
anybody who’s in an important position is confined merely to his own . . . particular field of
interest.” 23 The agenda of the Council was determined by the Special Assistant.
Important for any understanding of Eisenhower’s NSC is his first Special Assistant for
National Security, Robert Cutler, a banker from Boston who worked as a staff officer in World
War II. According to Cutler’s successor, a Texas lawyer and businessman named Dillon
Anderson, “The President’s concept of the National Security Council and the use he wanted to
make of it was the work of Robert Cutler.” 24 In an article published during Cutler’s tenure as
special assistant, he was described by the qualities most apparently visible about him: an affable
good nature and a sense of humor. However, insiders knew that he was, “a key figure in . . . the
transforming of the National Security Council into the most important policy-making agency this

23
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country has ever known.” 25 Though erring in regards to the NSC as being a policy making
agency, the magazine does properly describe Cutler’s importance in setting the Council’s agenda
and his general unobtrusiveness in performing that role and remaining a neutral figure. “[Cutler
is] extremely aware that his effectiveness depends upon suppressing any urge for personal power
and remaining in the background.” 26 Cutler himself would explain later that, “My job was to
administer, to serve, to get things done, to be trusted,” but he had, “no independent status,” as he
acted for the president in organizing the NSC and managing the various policymakers’ opinions
without betraying his own personal thoughts. 27 Cutler was to provide the essential staff work.
Eisenhower, as Cutler noted, “was accustomed to good staff work.” 28 Cutler knew well what his
role was, as he had been instrumental in determining how the NSC would run at the beginning of
Eisenhower’s administration.
In a meeting at the Commodore Hotel with his transition team on January 12 and 13,
1953, Eisenhower focused on national security as a key issue. At this meeting, Eisenhower
announced Cutler as the Special Assistant for National Security and the point man in adjusting
the NSC for Eisenhower’s purposes. Cutler had served as Eisenhower’s NSC expert during the
campaign, as he had previously worked on the Psychological Study Board as its deputy and had
been the assistant to James Forrestal while the latter had been the Secretary of Defense. 29 Cutler
began a sweeping look at Council operating procedures, meeting with, among others, George
Marshall, Ferdinand Eberhardt, and the NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who would be

25
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asked to stay on. 30 Based on the advice he received, especially from George Marshall, Cutler
resolved that policy papers should clearly spell out alternatives and include disagreements among
staffers, that the NSC would need a full time senior staff, that there should be a presidential
presence whenever possible, and there needed to be a member of the White House to run herd on
the various departments, which would be his role as Special Assistant. 31 With these ideas in
mind, Cutler would oversee the creation of the Planning Board and the Operations Control
Board.
The Planning Board would play a vital role in the operation of the Council, as it was the
place of the preparatory work. What would be discussed at Council meetings was determined by
the Planning Board. As they drafted policy papers, they were not expected to iron over their
disagreements, but rather include dissenting opinions in the paper to the Council. 32 In attendance
would be Cutler as chairperson, a CIA deputy director, a representative of the Joint Chiefs, and
whatever representatives of whichever department had interest or expertise pertaining to a
specific issue. 33 The Joint Chiefs’ representative was in a curious position. Cutler explained that,
“The Chiefs . . . are like the College of Cardinals. They are a different body than anything else in
the world.” He continued that, as a matter of protocol, “[They] cannot formally give an opinion
on a paper until the paper is in final, formal form and has been circulated to the members. We
often know very clearly . . . how the Chiefs will react . . . but we do not get it in writing until
they see the paper has been sent to the Council members.” 34 Despite any protocol or

30
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departmental difficulties, all those who attended were described by Cutler as being “highly
qualified” representatives who had direct access to the head of whichever agency or department
they represented. 35 This was a change from previous practice, where without the Planning Board,
the Council members themselves advocated policies. Eisenhower explained that, “You council
members . . . simply do not have enough time to do what needs to be done in thinking out the
best decisions regarding the national security . . . Someone must therefore do much of this
thinking for you. 36 ” In addition to the Planning Board’s effect on the Council members
themselves, it also provided interaction for the different department members. Cutler explained
that, “More important than what is planned is that the planners become accustomed to working
together on hard problems, enabling them . . . to arrive more surely at a reasonable plan of
policy.” 37
The plans formulated by the Planning Board would go up what would be described as
“Policy Hill,” with Eisenhower and the NSC at the top, where the proposals were discussed,
modified, or combined. 38 These papers required advanced planning, with typically two or three
sessions used to work up a draft. 39 The Planning Board met with greater frequency than did the
NSC proper; rather than one meeting a week, they met three times a week during Eisenhower’s
first term and two times a week in the second. Cutler explained that for his first three-and-a-half
year stint, he was the chair of some 504 Planning Board sessions. 40 This process was geared
more toward long-range policy planning. Taking such time to iron out policy statements could be
gave their opinion before the final draft was created, it could impact the ultimate independent conclusions upon
which the Chiefs would comment later.
35
Cutler, No Time For Rest, 296
36
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cumbersome. However, the Planning Board did have the ability to work intensively when
needed. According to Cutler, for an unidentified Asian crisis, the Planning Board met three
successive days, working a total of twenty-five hours to come up with a new draft. 41 After
chairing the Board and coordinating the process, Cutler would then be charged with the duty of
presenting the papers to the council and emphasizing any splits that had occurred during the
drafting process. 42
With the Planning Board controlling input into the Council, the Operations Control Board
handled the results of Council meetings. It was formed September 2, 1953, both to coordinate the
activities of the departments involved in NSC decisions and to report on any progress. It replaced
the old Psychological Operations Board, to provide coordination for more than just
psychological operations. 43 While a statutory body, it was not officially part of the NSC system
until an executive order February 25, 1957. Though it had formal meetings, most of the business
was conducted over luncheons with representatives of the various agencies involved. It was a
curious mix of formal and informal arrangements. It never quite lived up to what Eisenhower and
Cutler hoped it would be, and was continuously adjusted throughout the administration. The
Planning Board and OCB were both supplemented by the NSC support staff, was not made up of
appointees but rather career individuals who helped preserve what historian Phillip Henderson,
in his study of Eisenhower’s leadership, identified as “institutional memory,” the maintenance of
continuity among various administrations. In explaining how the council worked, Cutler
identified the ideal way in which these bodies interacted to advise the president. For example,
41
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discussions in regards to circumstances in a theoretical country Cutler called “Ruritania” would
be scheduled months in advance of the NSC meeting addressing the problem. There would be
three to five sessions devoted to that item, with factual and analytical statements prepared. A
draft would be written, torn apart, and continuously rewritten. Cutler explained that they sought
agreement on the correctness of facts, while there would be divergent opinions in analysis. The
Council members would receive the Planning Board document ten days ahead of time, and the
Joint Chiefs would be asked their opinions. 44 This process reinforced the fact that the NSC
machinery worked best in terms of long-range planning on situations that would be fairly static;
it was not a perfect system. Cutler himself acknowledged this: “it is certainly true that human
beings are fallible and that the instruments which they create are always susceptible of
improvement. The mechanism which I have described, and is in operation, can and will be
improved as time goes one.” 45
While Robert Cutler reformed and refined the machinery of the National Security
Council, it was accepted and implemented because it reflected how Eisenhower felt about proper
advisory systems. “There was no doubt,” Dillon Anderson explained, “who was running the
show.” 46 Eisenhower’s influence could be seen in the orderly, formal structures of the system.
“No American president believed more strongly in an orderly system for strategic planning and
policy making, and that a well-conceived organization was essential for such a system.” 47 Many
noted that no president came into the White House with more experience in efficiently running
large bureaucratic bodies than Dwight D. Eisenhower. “Eisenhower knew how to run a staff and
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make it work to his liking.” 48 Phillip Henderson, however, made a key distinction that the
National Security Council was not organized along precisely military lines. 49 The key was that
Eisenhower learned the value of organization and how to work with subordinates during his
years with the military, but this did not translate directly to the civilian world. He recognized that
his cabinet and staff were mostly civilians. He set up clear lines of authority on staff matters to
be sure, but was not rigid in methods of receiving advice. Thomas Preston, in his study of
presidential leadership methods, noted that “although characterized by elaborate formal
structures, Eisenhower’s advisory system incorporated an unusual mix of formal and informal
channels of advice.” 50 From his experience with the politics of high command, he was more than
able to use his informal channels with statesmen as well as soldiers.
The person he most communicated with in both formal and informal settings was John
Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State. The President’s Staff Secretary, General Andy Goodpaster,
reported that Eisenhower told him that, “[he] knew the inside of Foster Dulles’ mind the way he
knew the inside of his own mind.” 51 Eisenhower himself reported that he would sometimes talk
to Dulles as many as eight to ten times a day on the phone, depending upon what was happening
in the world, and at the end of the day Eisenhower and Dulles would occasionally meet for
drinks and discuss business and personal subjects. 52 However, it was not only Dulles who had
the ability to communicate so directly with the President. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, Sherman
Adams, reported that Eisenhower had a policy of being open to any “reasonable” member of the
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executive as long as he was not currently occupied, though Adams did acknowledge that only
Dulles regularly took Eisenhower up on the offer. 53 This personal communication was aided by
Eisenhower’s interpersonal skills. He was very approachable, helping inspire great loyalty in his
staffers. George Kennan would note that, “Eisenhower was . . . charming and disarming . . . he
was a very good talker,” who could, “put you off[guard] with his charm.” 54 Dillon Anderson
reported that Eisenhower was, “without trying to do so” an extremely charismatic person. 55 He
placed a great deal of trust in his individual staff members to do their jobs. The only frustrations
that he reportedly had with major cabinet officials occurred when an official did not act with the
independence he expected, notably in the case of the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson.
Arthur Radford, the Joint Chiefs Chairman, explained, “the president was annoyed with Mr.
Wilson’s approach to some things . . . He would give you the impression he was beating around
the bush. The President was used to men who made a very direct answer.” Adams observed that
that, “Mr. Wilson . . . discombobulated the President by his detailed discussions about his
Department [issues] . . . [That Eisenhower] thought he ought to have taken a stand on himself[and] not bothered him about it.” 56 This structure that Eisenhower built up, mixing the formal
and the informal, was in its early days in January of 1954. At this time, the crisis at Dien Bien
Phu began to develop a long-simmering situation in Indochina into a new hot spot in the Cold
War.
Part II
53
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In January of 1954, France had been fighting for over eight years in Indochina, having
reentered the nation following World War II in late October of 1945. The French fought the
communist Vietminh. By 1950, President Truman and his policy advisors agreed that Indochina
was the key to holding Southeast Asia. From 1950-52, the U.S. spent fifty million dollars in aid
to the French, and in the fiscal year of 1953, one third of France’s war costs were paid for by the
United States. 57 Relations were strained as the United States demanded that the French
decolonize. The French insisted that Indochina at least be kept in the French Union, and they
kept delaying independence for the Associated States of Indochina, Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia. The military support to the French continued under Eisenhower, and in mid-1953,
Henri Navarre was appointed to the command of French forces in Vietnam. His plan was to
enlist broader support among the indigenous population while marshalling French forces for a
1955 assault. 58 On November 20, 1953, Navarre launched Operation Castor and took control of
the air strip of an administrative area called Dien Bien Phu, located in a valley in northern
Vietnam. 59
Meanwhile, Eisenhower had put together a group to adjust U.S. Security Policy. Called
the Solarium Project, its members produced what would be known as NSC 162/2, a plan which
became known as the New Look. It reduced conventional forces in favor of massive retaliatory
capabilities. NSC 162/2 would contain an interesting note on Indochina: “certain other countries,
such as Indo-China . . . are of such strategic importance to the United States that an attack on
57
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them probably would compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the
point of attack or generally against the military power of the aggressor.” 60 There were U.S.
advisors in Indochina at this time. Lt. General John W. O’Daniel and his staff had returned to
Vietnam after a visit the previous summer. His conclusion, reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
was that “real military progress in implementation of the ‘Navarre Plan’ is evident . . . prospects
for victory appear increasingly encouraging. 61 ” Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, declared in an address given December 2, 1953 that there was hope for victory in
Indochina. 62 Not all readers were happy with O’Daniel’s report. Army Chief of Staff Matthew
Ridgway, while not concerned about Dien Bien Phu at the time, found O’Daniel to be overlyoptimistic. 63 Eisenhower himself was disgusted with the situation at Dien Bien Phu. “As a
soldier,” he would explain, “I was horror stricken. I just said, ‘my goodness, you don’t pen
troops in a fortress, and all history shows that they are just going to be cut to pieces.’” 64 By
January of 1954, the French were in Dien Bien Phu, their opponents, the Vietminh, around them,
and the United States had invested a substantial amount of money to save the “key” in Southeast
Asia.
Early in January, the 179th meeting of the National Security Council was held, which
discussed a policy paper prepared on Indochina, NSC 177 and its Special Annex, which
concerned intervention possibilities. At the time, the military situation remained steady. The
French were only “somewhat disturbed” about Dien Bien Phu. Allen Dulles, director of the CIA,
put forth the proposition that the loss of Dien Bien Phu would not be a large military victory for
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the Vietminh, but a political one. 65 Richard Nixon’s contribution to the meeting were mainly
political, as he warned that the French intended to keep the Vietnamese in the French Union,
while the Vietnamese desired independence, noting that, “the essence of the problem is
political.” 66 Radford established his position early, warning that all that could be done to prevent
defeat at Dien Bien Phu should be done, noting that as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet
he had drawn up plans to aid the French with air power. 67 When talk began drifting over to
combat operations, Cutler broke in with the note that nothing in NSC 177 addressed combat
unless the Chinese became involved.
The meeting demonstrated three significant characteristics of the NSC. First, Cutler
steered the conversation to specifically refer to papers discussed, and not expand beyond them.
Eisenhower, however, desired to continue discussion. He floated the idea of giving the French a
group of airmen without U.S. insignia. This shows both how the formal structure of the NSC
could focus on a particular subject while Eisenhower could work beyond that structure on a point
he felt particularly important. 68 A second characteristic revealed in the 179th meeting was
Eisenhower’s active contribution. While he would later discuss airmen, he first stated that, in
regards to intervention with ground troops, “I can not tell you . . . how bitterly opposed I am to
such a course of action. This war in Indochina would absorb our troops by divisions!” 69 In
making this statement after preliminary remarks by Radford, Eisenhower demonstrated what
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Greenstein and Burke call his, “persistent impulse to think in terms of consequences.” 70 Finally,
the meeting demonstrated the long-term process of the Council, as no decisions were ultimately
reached on NSC-177. The Special Annex, considered very sensitive, was ordered destroyed. 71
The next week, discussion continued in regards to the French in Indochina and Dien Bien
Phu. In discussing NSC-177, the council discussed its language; Dulles objected to a point in the
paper positing that the loss of Indochina would severely damage France’s world position. He
stressed that the NSC should only be concerned with the U.S world position. Cutler agreed to
make the change, and NSC 177 became NSC 5405 and was officially promulgated to the OCB. 72
The planning paper opened with a clear premise: “communist domination, by whatever means,
of all of Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the
long term, United States security interests,” noting that the primary threat came from internal
subversion. 73 It called for aggressive military, political, and psychological operations to be
carried out against the Vietminh, and for the further development of indigenous armed forces
that would eventually be capable of maintaining internal security. 74 It also suggested
“reiterating” to the French that, “in the absence of marked improvement in the military situation
there is no basis for negotiation with any prospect for acceptable terms.” 75 This referred to fears
the France would accept a cease-fire. In the event of Chinese intervention, the paper suggested
use of naval and air forces, with land forces to be considered when a crisis occurred, providing
an official NSC view on action for Indochina. 76 The paper was not, however, without some
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problems. NSC 5405 had not made provisions for the possibility of the French and Indochinese
forces failing to provide infantry. It advised unilateral action against targets in China if China
intervened, but had no recommendations or options in terms of the ground conflict in which the
United States might need to engage.
NSC 5405 included advice to continue attempts to encourage the French to follow U.S.
advice, while the French asked for more supplies. The U.S. position, despite its supplier-status,
was weak, “because of the overriding importance given by Washington to holding the
Communist line in Indochina, the French, in being able to threaten to withdraw, possessed an
important instrument of blackmail.” 77 As long as the United States saw both a vital need to hold
Indochina and a need to keep U.S. troops out of that area, the French could ask for a great deal
of material aid. While mulling over the situation, Eisenhower on January 18 privately met with a
group of men who would become his special committee for Indochina. He had been unhappy
with the Planning Board’s effort, for to him it lacked clear action and alternatives. 78 The creation
of ad hoc groups for a specific topic was a means Eisenhower had used before, such as when the
New Look was formulated. Cutler, after Eisenhower left office, explained that ad hoc groups
were valuable “for the introduction of fresh ideas and points of view other than those generated
within the government.” 79 The group selected (Radford, Allen Dulles, Undersecretary of State
Walter Bedell Smith, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Keyes, and C.D. Jackson, a White
House advisor) was able to meet outside the NSC apparatus to bring in fresh ideas. They met
first to discuss strategy and the additional aid the French requested: twenty-two B-26 bombers
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and 400 airmen. 80 When Keyes questioned if mechanics would be tantamount to ground forces,
Smith and Radford agreed that it would not be. Both affirmed that they did not support ground
forces. Radford felt only air intervention would be needed. 81
The Indochina Committee recommended to the president that twenty-two B-26s be given,
along with 200 U.S. Air Mechanics through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).
Part of their instructions was that they did not have to use the OCB to carry out their
recommendations, 82 which amounted to telling them not to use the OCB. The OCB as this point,
was, after all, relatively new, only having been formed in September and not yet incorporated in
the NSC structure. Radford’s recommendations were made despite his lack of faith in the French.
He would later explain that, “most of [The French Commanders] . . . did not impress me. . . . I
had no confidence in French military planning or military execution.” 83 While that statement was
made years after Dien Bien Phu, Radford was worried early on about a French defeat, indicating
at least a partial worry about French reliability. Yet, large amounts of aid continued to flow into
Indochina. Eisenhower agreed with the recommendations, with the only changes being that the
200 MAAG mechanics be rotated out by June 15, 1954 at the latest. 84 This committee
encapsulated Eisenhower’s ability to supplement the National Security Council if he felt it had
not given him the number of options he wanted. The Special Committee grappled directly with
keeping the French in Vietnam and strengthening them. When dissatisfied with his machinery,
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he “expanded the advisory process by ordering the creation of a new means of study and
deliberation.” 85
The situation at Dien Bien Phu itself remained fairly stable going into February. John
Foster Dulles was preparing to go to Berlin to take part in a conference that would, among other
things, determine if Indochina would be on the agenda for the Geneva Conference scheduled to
begin at the end of April. Discussion in February focused on Indochina as a whole, and ways to
increase the growth of indigenous forces. Eisenhower noted that a religious issue could unite
people, with a Buddhist leader providing an anti-communist rallying point. 86 Discussion
continued, with Nixon noting the Bao Dai, the emperor of Vietnam, did not fit the bill for an
inspirational leader. Dulles noted that there were 1.5 million Roman Catholics in Vietnam who
might be enlisted in the struggle. In the end, it was decided that more, and hopefully better,
officers of the United States Information Service be sent to Vietnam. 87 Eisenhower was, in the
context of discussion in the NSC, more than willing to suggest new and unconventional ideas in
the Council, ideas which often did not lead to a specific action. Nixon noted that, “[Eisenhower]
could be very enthusiastic about half-baked ideas in the discussion stage, but when it came to
making a final decision, he was the coldest, most unemotional man in the world.” 88 While still
keeping in mind the spiritual side of the conflict, noting in a later meeting that, “the mood of
discouragement [in Vietnam] came from the evident lack of a spiritual force among the French
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and the Vietnamese, Eisenhower kept his decisions realistic, sending more propaganda officers
rather than trying to start a spiritual revolution. 89
In February, the main focus of the Eisenhower administration in foreign affairs was not
chiefly Indochina, but rather Berlin. The administration was worried that the conference would
put Indochina on the agenda, and was also concerned any attempt to prevent placing Indochina
on the agenda would result in a French backlash which would threaten the proposed European
Defense Community Treaty; the U.S. greatly desired support for this treaty. After having
invested so much into Indochina, the U.S felt betrayed when Indochina was placed on the
agenda. 90 With a developing situation depending upon adaptable diplomacy, Eisenhower
coordinated with John Foster Dulles abroad. Dulles warned that Indochina was interwoven with
the EDC. He opined that, “this political exertion on our part against [the] conference carries
moral obligation to continue to sustain military effort,” because if the talks were not held and the
U.S. did not provide aid, the negative effect on Franco-American relations would sink the
EDC. 91 Upon returning from Europe and reporting to the NSC, Dulles explained that the French
would not press hard at the Conference Table unless there was a “substantial military disaster.” 92
The Special Committee for Indochina made another report at the beginning of March.,
which urged the continued strengthening of indigenous forces, the recruitment of aid from
foreign countries, the strengthening the French Foreign Legion, the augmentation of the MAAG,
89
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and psychological warfare operations. If that plan failed, the committee recommended
considering direct military intervention. 93 While Eisenhower would have been considering this
advice, the NSC was also focused on Indochina, with Dien Bien Phu relatively secure. Harold
Stassen, director of the Foreign Operations Administration, reported at the 187th NSC meeting
that, after visiting Vietnam, he “had a strong feeling that the military situation was a great deal
better than we had imagined,” and that the French position was so strong they hoped to be
attacked. 94 While not mentioning any reservations in the Council meeting, Eisenhower’s record
with regards to Indochina action would suggest that he was not particularly optimistic. He had
made his general position clear in January, with his warning that forces would be swallowed in
the Vietnamese jungles. After his presidency, Eisenhower explained that he felt from the
beginning that the French plan was “just silly.” 95 To this point, the NSC had not played a
decisive role in determining policy in regards to Indochina. Radford and the committee, along
with Dulles in Europe, counseled Eisenhower independent of the Council. The situation had not
been an emergency one yet, either. That would change, as on the afternoon of March 13, the
assault on Dien Bien Phu finally began.
Part III
Initially, the role of the NSC remained limited. On March 18 it was reported that the
situation at Dien Bien Phu was relatively steady, with intelligence estimates giving the French a
50-50 chance of holding Dien Bien Phu. No action was ultimately decided, and the Planning
Board was not tasked with drawing up any plans for the situation. 96 The next meeting, however,

93

Report by the President’s Special Committee on Indochina, 2 March 1954, ibid., 1110-1116.
Memorandum of Discussion at the 187th Meeting of the NSC, Thursday, March 4, 1954, ibid., 1093.
95
Eisenhower, Princeton interview, 26.
96
Memorandum of Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 18,
1954, FRUS 1952-1954, vol.13, pt.1, 1132-33.
94

88

carried greater significance. The JCS had urged the council to examine the question of U.S.
commitment in a report to the Council, which prompted Eisenhower to order Cutler to examine
the situation with the Planning Board; Eisenhower stated explicitly that he wanted options
including ground forces. Allen Dulles noted that the situation had improved for the French
somewhat, though noting that the French could not support Dien Bien Phu because they did not
control the roads in the surrounding countryside, or anywhere near the area. This led Eisenhower
to comment, “if the point had been reached when the French forces could be moved only by air,
it seemed sufficient indication that the population of Vietnam did not wish to be free from
Communist domination.” 97 However, he later observed that, “The collapse of Indochina would
produce a chain reaction which would result in the fall of Southeast Asia to the communists,” 98
indicating his belief in the domino effect of one country’s fall to communism taking others with
it. With these two frames of action in mind, the Planning Board was directed to look also at both
unilateral and multilateral reaction. Another worry was the reaction of China to intervention.
When Charles Wilson raised the question, Cutler turned the Council’s attention back to NSC
5405, and its recommendation of U.S. strikes against China in the event of Chinese intervention.
The NSC calm observance during the March 18th meeting had been replaced in the March 25th
meeting with an actively probing group. The change between the two meetings had not been the
result of any change in the battle at Dien Bien Phu, however. The Council was deeply affected in
the time between the two meetings by the arrival of the French Chief of Staff, Paul Ely, who
accented the graveness of the situation.
Ely arrived in Washington in late March, and on the night of the 20th he dined at
Radford’s home, along with General Jean Etienne Valluy, the head of the French Mission to the
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United States. Also present were Richard Nixon, Allen Dulles, Army Chief of Staff Matthew
Ridgway, and Douglas MacArthur II. They discussed the situation at Dien Bien Phu, during
which time Ely confessed that the loss of Dien Bien Phu, while not a military disaster, would
wreck French morale. He indicated that the major French problem was lack of combat aircraft.
Ely requested forty more B-26s, along with 800 G-12 Type parachutes to deliver supplies to the
isolated fortress. 99 Radford later expressed some frustration at the French desire for more
parachutes, believing that the way the French employed them was part of a “terribly inefficient
military operation.” 100 The memo which was drawn up by Radford’s secretary reported that the
meeting ended after a short discussion following the French request of supplies. One of the
participants, however, recorded events slightly differently. General Ridgway drafted a memo in
which, at the end of the meeting, Radford wanted to confirm with Ely that, “what you really need
them for success is more air power.” Ridgway recorded that he responded immediately, stating,
“the experience of Korea, where we had complete domination of the air and a far more powerful
air force afforded no basis for thinking that some additional air power was going to bring
decisive results on the ground.” 101
Lacking other accounts of the meeting, it is impossible to know with any certainty how
the actual meeting ended. The fact that Radford’s secretary did not record this could simply
indicate that it was considered immaterial. Whatever was actually said, the fact that Ridgway
deemed it important enough to record indicates the early disagreement that would emerge among
the Joint Chiefs and their Chairman. The incident also indicates that Radford desired intervention
and that the French may have been aware of it. In a meeting of the Joint Chiefs on March 26,
99

Memorandum for the Record by Captain G.W Anderson, USN, Assistant to the Chariman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Radford): Conversations with General Paul Ely, 21 March 1954, ibid., 1138-40.
100
Radford, Princeton interview, 52.
101
Memorandum of Conversation at Home of Adm. Radford, evening of 20 March, 22 March 1954,
Matthew Ridgway Papers, Box 78, Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.

90

Radford noted that Ely’s report had made him pessimistic and increased his urgency for
intervention. In hindsight at least, he also realized it would not mean one quick strike, but a more
committed U.S. position, explaining that, “we would have been in the war, and it would have
been the beginning of a series of actions.” 102
Ely’s visit, in addition to strengthening Radford’s view that United States intervention
was required to save the situation in Indochina, became the root of a misunderstanding that
would deeply affect the situation. In later years, Radford was careful to note that there had been a
miscommunication between him and Ely, one which he stressed was not his fault. “I had
discussed with Ely, and I’m sure I told him that I thought we could do a certain thing. When I
talked to him he understood, or should have understood - and I think he did - that this was a
discussion of possibilities. 103 Ely came out of their meetings with a surer feeling for U.S. aid.
Some versions even have Radford offering the French the use of nuclear weapons as part of a
conventional arsenal.104 Radford had in the past urged the use of atomic weapons against
China. 105 Radford himself denied recommending any specific action, but noted, “If we had used
atomic weapons we probably would have been successful. We had atomic weapons we could
have used.” 106 MacArthur informed Dulles in April that Radford learned from a Pentagon study
group that three tactical nuclear weapons could smash the Vietminh effort at Dien Bien Phu.
Radford apparently wished to ask for French permission to use nuclear ordinance in Indochina if
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the U.S. intervened. MacArthur judged this as very dangerous. 107 The matter was dropped. In a
March 22, Ely, Nixon, and Radford discussed the details of a possible operation, wherein
hundreds of American aircraft would attack Vietminh positions. Ely later claimed that Radford
was enthusiastic about the plan and, “intimated that he had Eisenhower’s support.” 108 Radford
claimed that he emphasized that there would need to be governmental approval. It is possible that
neither man was being disingenuous; misunderstandings may have arisen due to language
difficulties as they had no interpreter. 109 Whatever the case, there was no agreement. The French
were confidant, however, that if they asked, the Americans would respond favorably. They
called the Operation Vatour (Vulture) and included it in their planning.110
The rest of the Joint Chiefs, meanwhile, did not agree with Radford in regards to
intervention and, in the case of Ridgway, the nature of the JCS apparatus itself. Some of the
disagreement was relatively minor. For example, Radford suggested in a meeting with Ely that
C-119 Cargo Planes be used to drop napalm on enemy positions. 111 However, the Commander of
the Far East Air Force (COMFEAF), recommended earlier that they not be used for that purpose,
stating that “aircraft loaned to the French . . . are primarily for airlift purposes. The use of these
same aircraft for combat purposes might well generate a requirement for additional aircraft
which FEAF would like to avoid if possible.” 112 Radford called the Chiefs together to ask
whether they should recommend to the President and the NSC that the United States should
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intervene through an airstrike. Radford himself recommended this action, but the rest of the Joint
Chiefs did not. 113 All sent back reactions that were essentially negative. The Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Robert Carney, was the most ambiguous, stating that Indochina should be
saved if possible, but he was not prepared to say the strike would be decisive. Nathan Twining,
the Air Force Chief, gave his answer as a qualified “yes,” dependent on whether or not the
French allowed for a U.S. command of Air Forces under a French Theater Commander, a greater
role in training the indigenous forces for the U.S, and true Vietnamese sovereignty first. Given
that Twining’s conditions were extremely unlikely to have been met, he was essentially a
“no.” 114 Lemuel Shepherd, commandant of the Marine Corps, was a clear “no,” stating that “Air
intervention in the current fighting in Indochina would be an unprofitable adventure,” that would
not turn the tide of the battle, nor would it contribute to French victory in Indochina elsewhere,
nor would it deter communists. The United States would be in a situation where it would have to
admit failure or use ground forces, both of which were, to Shepherd, unacceptable. 115 Ridgway
was the most strident “no.” He questioned whether it was even proper for Radford to put the
question to them. The Joint Chiefs were, after all, not even supposed to comment on policy to the
NSC until formal drafts went through the Planning Board. To go to the president preemptively to
create policy was questionable. Ridgway noted that the issue “was clearly outside the proper
scope of authority of the JCS. This body was neither charged with formulating foreign policy,
nor of advocating it, unless its advice was specifically sought by the president, or the Secretary
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of Defense. To do otherwise,” Ridgway warned, “would be to involve the JCS inevitably in
politics.” 116
Possibly as a result of his regular interaction with the NCS, Radford had no difficulty
recommending what he believed was an urgently needed course of action. He felt that Ridgway
was a good field commander, but depended too much on his staff, later claiming that, “he wasn’t
an independent thinker.” 117 Ridgway, beyond his problems with the propriety of the request, was
deeply opposed to a strike at Dien Bien Phu on military grounds. He made his feelings known in
his memoranda. The disagreement would leave a strong enough impression on Ridgway that
when he retired, his letter to Wilson clearly referenced Dien Bien Phu and Radford’s request for
support in advising intervention. With regard to recommending action to the president and NSC
when unsolicited, Ridgway said that “I have not been convinced that this is a proper role for a
military leader.” 118 He continued that, strategically speaking:
I am opposed to the overemphasis of any military force where dependence on that force
exceeds its capabilities. . . . The army has no wish to scrap its previous experience in favor of
unproven doctrine, or in order to accommodate enthusiastic theorists having little or no
responsibility for the consequences of following the courses of action they advocate . . . Nothing
currently available . . . reduces the essentiality of mobile, powerful ground forces, the only
forces which can seize the enemies’ land and the people living thereon, and exercise control
over both. 119

The Joint Chiefs were not the only military men who made their views known. Other military
officers expressed clear views against intervention. For example, Admiral A.C Davis, Director of
the Office of Military Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, explained that, “The U.S
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should not be self-duped into believing the possibility of partial involvement such as ‘naval and
air units only.’ One cannot go over Niagara falls in a barrel only slightly. . . . It is difficult to
understand how involvement of ground forces could be avoided.” 120 Radford continued to
advocate intervention.
Dulles was much more ambivalent about intervention, and less willing to express his
opinion to foreign representatives than Radford was. He met with Radford and Ely in his office
on March 23, the main topic of conversation was U.S. reaction to potential Chinese intervention.
In his memorandum of the meeting for the President, Dulles proffered the view that “if the
United States sent its flag and its own military establishment-land, sea, or air- into the Indochina
war, then the prestige of the United States would be engaged to the point where we would want
to have a success.” 121 With such a complicated question, Dulles put off answering Ely until he
could consult with the President, demonstrating a difference between him and Radford;
Radford’s desire to intervene was apparently communicated to Ely.
Dulles would also utilize NSC resources. The same day he met with Ely, he received a
report from Robert Bowie on the extent of Chinese intervention, who were providing supplies of
ammunition and cannon, and 2,000 Chinese soldiers manning artillery and anti-aircraft pieces. 122
Enclosed with Bowie’s letter was a letter from Charles Stelle, also of the Policy Planning Board,
warning that if the Tonkin Delta fell, Communist forces would have a clear way into Southern
Indochina and Thailand, warning that, “countries in the Far East, South Asia, and elsewhere in
the world would be encouraged to adopt policies of accommodation to communist pressures and
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objectives.” 123 Dulles would use these materials in a speech for the Press Club, warning of the
2,000 communist Chinese Bowie mentioned and the danger to the “entire Western Pacific area,”
echoing Stelle’s sentiments. 124 Dulles, like Eisenhower, was in the loop of the NSC. He
discussed with Eisenhower the situation the day after receiving the reports from Bowie and
Stelle. At this meeting between him and Dulles, Eisenhower expressed his own opinion on the
situation. Dulles reported that
The President said that he agreed basically that we should not get involved in fighting in
Indochina unless there were political preconditions necessary for a successful outcome. He did
not, however, wholly exclude the possibility of a single strike, if it were almost certain this
would produce decisive results. 125

In consultation with Dulles, but after receiving NSC information, Eisenhower had decided that
wholesale intervention would probably not go forward unilaterally. This was in keeping with his
desire to avoid combat troops in the jungles of Vietnam. The NSC was used as it was supposed
to be used: a tool for gathering options and information, along with consultation with men like
Dulles. Nixon would note later that, in meetings with the NSC, the Cabinet, or congressional
leaders, Eisenhower would “always go back to his office to reflect on what he had heard before
deciding.” 126
During this time, the Planning Board demonstrated both its ability to react quickly in a
crisis and its institutional memory. A Special Annex was prepared detailing contingencies for
U.S. action. This was the Annex that had been prepared for NSC 177, and ordered destroyed. It
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would appear that at least one copy was preserved, as it was quickly taken and readjusted for
current circumstances. The first contingency covered the possibility that without U.S. aid, France
would be forced to withdraw from Indochina. It said that if direct U.S. aid was judged to be
meaningful, intervention would be further studied, but would focus on full independence for the
Associated States, a continuing policy of arming indigenous forces, and seeking U.N. aid. The
second contingency, if the United States offered to intervene but the French withdrew regardless
of such an offer, meant that the United States could either accept the loss of Indochina or choose
one of four options. Option A would be to urge the French to stage a coordinated withdrawal as
the U.S. utilized ground forces, Option B called for using ground forces to only hold French hard
points while training indigenous forces, Option C would be the use of naval and air power alone
while training the indigenous forces, and Option D was to provide no direct support, only
training. The Planning Board noted that these contingencies were valid under certain
circumstances only: no renewal of the Korean War, no intervention by the Soviets or Chinese,
and no expansion of the combat theater outside Indochina. 127 It also warned that Option A, and
to a lesser extent B, would force “major alterations in fiscal and budgetary programs . . . and a
reversal of policy planning to reduce the size of the U.S. Armed Forces.” 128 Option A had a
further drawback, as it was estimated that seven divisions would be necessary to successfully
conduct operations, while only five were available under current deployments. 129 With these
options in mind, the NSC met April 1. Radford argued for immediate intervention, or the
situation would be untenable. 130 Eisenhower told Radford that he understood the rest of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff did not support air intervention. When Radford brought up his urge for action
127

Special Annex on Indochina, FRUS 1952-1954, vol.13, pt.1 1182-1186.
Ibid., 1186
129
Ibid.
130
Memorandum of Discussion at the 191st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, April 1,
1954, ibid., 1200-1201.
128

97

later, Eisenhower let the matter drop, but said that he wanted to meet with certain members of
the NSC afterward. No official action was adopted other than further review. 131 Radford and
Dulles were to meet with Congress a few days after this meeting to brief them on the situation
and request authority for unilateral aid if Eisenhower deemed it necessary. In a conversation with
Eisenhower, Wilson, and Radford Eisenhower, Dulles told Eisenhower that he believed that
Radford wanted Congressional approval to actually intervene, whereas he, Dulles, wanted to use
the possibility of intervention as a deterrent. 132
At a meeting with Congress to secure the ability to intervene, Dulles and Radford found
that the feeling was unanimous among the senators that “we want no more Koreas with the
United States furnishing 90% of the manpower.” He added that, while only air intervention was
currently being considered, “once the flag was committed the use of land forces would inevitably
follow.” 133 Radford, when asked if a direct air attack would change the situation, said that it
would have three weeks before, but not at the moment. This would have placed the best time for
air intervention, according to Radford, about four days before Ely had even arrived in
Washington. 134 That same day, Bowie expressed to Dulles that the NSC needed to reach a
decision as to whether or not intervention was even desired, and if so, how the U.S. would go
about planning such intervention and securing Congressional support, and an invitation from
France and the Associated States to intervene. 135 Bowie’s comments represented part of the
frustrations that the NSC was not as quick to respond as desired, though in fact the decisions
regarding ground forces appear, from Eisenhower’s personal meetings and comments, to have
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already been decided in the negative. A single air strike remained a possibility. Eisenhower
apparently kept that decision to himself and Dulles, and continued to receive counsel as to
intervention and kept that possibility publicly on the table.
Eisenhower would soon have to face the consequences of that fact, as the French
concluded that only Vulture could save the situation. Valluy had requested that the United States
carry out Operation Vulture on April 4. 136 Eisenhower was annoyed that Radford had told the
French during Ely’s visit he would do his best to see that the U.S. carried out the operation. He
told Dulles that, “[Radford] should never have told [a] foreign country he would do his best
because they then start putting pressure on us.” 137 As a man who prized his own counsel,
Eisenhower clearly did not like the idea of one of his subordinates discussing their counsel
outside the U.S. government. Radford may have known Eisenhower’s displeasure, as he wrote
to Dulles after the U.S. decided not to intervene that there was some kind of mix up and that he,
“suspect[ed] the French of political machinations later to justify their actions,” possibly to deflect
any condemnation of his own actions. 138
All these factors led to the April 6 meeting of the National Security Council, which was
held earlier than usual, on a Tuesday, in view of the deteriorating situation in Indochina. This
meeting proved the most important meeting regarding Dien Bien Phu. After the initial discussion
of the situation, Cutler pointed out that the Planning Board paper promulgated March 29, in
addition to spelling out contingency actions, noted that regardless of Dien Bien Phu, the contest
in Indochina had yet to be decided. Wilson, Radford, and Allen Dulles all disagreed, feeling the
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Planning Board report was too optimistic. Eisenhower expressed his belief that the fall of Dien
Bien Phu could not be considered a military defeat, as the French had already inflicted 10,000 to
20,000 casualties upon the Vietminh. He did not understand why the French did not send a relief
column in force to the besieged area, echoing his continuing frustration with the French
command performance. Following Congress’s recent reaction, Eisenhower pointed out that,
“there was no possibility whatever of U.S. unilateral intervention in Indochina, and we had best
face that fact.” 139
Dulles agreed that unilateral action support would be impossible. From the discussions
emerged the desire to seek British involvement and prepare an organization similar to NATO in
the region to prevent its total fall to Communism, a policy Dulles called “United Action.” While
not directly stated, Eisenhower made it clear that unilateral intervention was unlikely:
The President expressed his hostility to the notion that because we might lose Indochina
we would necessarily lose all the rest of Southeast Asia . . . the President expressed warm
approval for the idea of a political organization which would have for its purpose the defense of
South-east Asia even if Indochina should be lost. 140

Though a deviation from the Domino theory, the argument justified the lack of U.S. commitment
in the region Eisenhower desired. 141 Stassen recommended a midway course between
intervention and allowing Indochina to fall. He suggested establishing a South Vietnamese
nation with a regional defense treaty built around it. Radford, still wholly supporting the Domino
theory, objected that it would cause a negative chain reaction. The Secretary of the Treasury,
George Humphrey, noted that if elections were held, South Vietnam could well go Communist,
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though Eisenhower rebuked him, stating, “no free government had yet gone communist by its
own choice.” Eisenhower concluded his discussion with Humphrey with the decision that, “we
are not prepared now to take action with respect to Dien Bien Phu . . . but the coalition program
for Southeast Asia must go forward as a matter of the greatest urgency.” Responding to Treasury
Secretary George Humphrey’s concerns that the U.S. was embarking on a policy of trying to
intervene wherever there were communist governments, Eisenhower explained that “in certain
areas at least we cannot afford to let Moscow gain another bit of territory.” Eisenhower
expressed his feeling that Indochina was not a place the U.S. should take action in at the
moment, but noted that if a regional defense group went forward, “the battle is two-thirds
won.” 142 While agreeing that external and internal communist subversion was unacceptable,
Nixon also pointed out that the U.S. had to avoid the political weight of appearing to be
imperialists in the mold of the French and the British. The decision was reached to focus on
creating an organization with the French, British, and local countries for regional defense. This
was to be done in conjunction with an accelerated plan for Associated State independence. 143
The April 6 meeting of the NSC was vital because it was there that Eisenhower made
clear to the NSC his decision that the United States would not engage in unilateral intervention in
Indochina, but rather would seek to create an alliance system in Southeast Asia to compensate
for the possible fall of Indochina in the wake of Dien Bien Phu. Multilateral intervention
remained a possibility, but only if the British were involved. This proposal offered several
advantages. It required much less U.S. manpower on the ground. It would insure that if the U.S.
intervened it would not appear colonialist. It might have rendered intervention unnecessary.
Immerman and Herring note that, in policy considerations was the fact that, “the mere
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establishment of such a coalition accompanied by stern warnings to the Communists might be
sufficient to bolster the French will to resist,” though ultimately United Action would provide the
best conditions for the U.S to intervene if necessary. 144 This ultimate decision had resulted from
both the NSC machinery and Eisenhower’s informal discussions. He had, in his talks with
Dulles, established beforehand that he believed unilateral intervention would never be accepted.
Even Dulles only wished to obtain its possibility as a threat. The Special Index of NSC 177/5405
warned that intervention would play havoc with U.S. forces and their ability to act around the
globe, a disruption Eisenhower was not prepared to cause if Indochina’s fall did not mean the fall
of all of Southeast Asia. After all, if he had invested in unilateral intervention, the U.S. would
have been forced to shift divisions to leave two more open and lack a strategic reserve, or the fill
the extra divisions by recruitment or a draft.
In the meeting, Eisenhower demonstrated his habit of introducing and discussing
apparently unplanned ideas, like a regional defense pact, which gained traction and became U.S.
policy. However, it would appear that Eisenhower had part of the United Action idea in mind, as
prior to the meeting; Eisenhower had written Churchill to gather support for the French. He told
Churchill that if Indochina fell, in his view, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia would be hard “to
keep out of Communist hands,” quite at odds with the conclusions Eisenhower had reached
privately. 145 He told Churchill that the best way to aid the French would be the establishment of
an “ad hoc grouping or coalition composed of nations which have vital concern in the checking
of Communist expansion in the area.” 146 This correspondence revealed that Eisenhower was
being discreet, both with the Council, in not telling them how far along his thinking was in
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regards to action with allies, and to his allies, with whom he did not share his own conclusions.
Despite this, the Council does not seem to have been irrelevant. Eisenhower actively engaged the
Council members regarding policy and suggested that he was testing out his own thinking using
the Council process. In the meeting he found support for his ideas and a chance to discuss them
in greater detail.
At this point, policy had been essentially decided, and further workings and re-workings
would be of a more informal nature. As Greenstein and Burke explain,
The shift to informal deliberation occurred because the problems confronting the
administration in Southeast Asia in this period [following the April 6 meeting] were largely
operational. The NSC as a policy planning body was not an appropriate instrument for
supervising negotiations with Congress or allied nations. 147

After this meeting, Dulles and then Radford would depart for Europe to try and iron out the
policy decided upon in the April 6th session. Dulles reported that the British were hesitant to act
before Geneva as they were fearful of a ground war and did not believe Indochina’s fall would
lead to the fall of all of Southeast Asia. 148 This was, of course, also Eisenhower’s private view.
Dulles remained Eisenhower’s chief personal advisor, while Radford was clearly still too
interventionist for Eisenhower’s taste. 149 Dulles had departed for Europe on April 10, and would
remain there for three weeks. He managed to secure from Eden an agreement to participate in a
conference of powers before Geneva to discuss positions going into the talks. In Paris, his next
destination, Dulles tried to convince the French to support United Action and not give in at
Geneva. These plans were dropped, however, when the British pulled out of the conference of
147
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allied powers before Geneva. 150 The French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, would later
claim that in his desperation for action, Dulles offered him the use of three atomic bombs. This is
unsubstantiated by any other sources and seems quite unlikely given how far outside Dulles’
authority such an offer would have been; furthermore Dulles’ previous behavior does not hint
that he would take such a step. 151
Meanwhile, Radford arrived in England, where he met with England’s Foreign Minister
Anthony Eden and Ely. Ely stressed that Operation Vulture had to be carried out. Radford
reported that, “[Ely] was surprised that I had not heard about [Operation Vulture] before. He
went on further to say that this indicated a lack of close contact between the Americans and the
military in Indochina which distressed him.” 152 Ely had not caught the drift that only multilateral
intervention was an option. After the British pulled out of the Pre-Geneva meeting, Radford
recounted that “[Eisenhower] indicated that I had frightened the British by my hard words or
something - I don’t know what they could have been. For my part I think Eden was a rather weak
sister. He gave us the impression in Paris . . . that he was going to work with us.” 153 Also during
this time, possibly adding to English fear, was the fact that Richard Nixon had answered
hypothetical press questions in regards to Indochina and mentioned that the U.S. might have to
intervene, which disturbed both the American public and possibly the British. 154
It was eventually made clear to the U.S. representatives in England that the British would
not support United Action. On April 23 and 24, Dulles continued to try and obtain Eden’s
agreement with United Action while turning down another French request for U.S. air
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intervention. 155 At a dinner Radford had with Winston Churchill, Radford gained the impression
that “Sir Winston was presently unprepared to participate in collective action.” This Radford
reported at the next NSC meeting upon his return to the United States, April 29. 156 According to
Radford’s later accounts, Churchill made it clear that the United Kingdom would not help the
French maintain their empire at the risk of nuclear war, after having lost so much of the British
Empire already. 157 Churchill had made his worries about the bomb known earlier, writing to
Eisenhower in March, writing, “There is widespread anxiety here about the H-bomb.” 158
Radford, who had in the past expressed a desire to use nuclear weaponry in Indochina, suggested
that his presence was perhaps not beneficial. Eden, for his part, was suspicious of U.S. motives.
During the Geneva Conference, he commented that, “all the Americans want to do is to replace
the French and run Indochina themselves. They want to replace us in Egypt too. They want to
run the world.” 159
With the British out of the picture, the NSC briefly looked at unilateral intervention
again. Stassen declared that some final decision reaching Indochina had to be reached, and he
urged that the U.S. “go to the limits.” Stassen and Eisenhower then engaged in one of the most
extensive back-and-forths on record concerning Indochina. Eisenhower expressed his doubt and
argued that if the United States went in after the French, it would appear as though the U.S. were
colonizers. Stassen argued that the United States had to act like a world leader. “Without allies
and associates,” Eisenhower explained, “the leader is just an adventurer like Genghis Khan.” 160
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Stassen countered that the U.S. could depend upon Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand.
Eisenhower expressed his belief that intervention in Indochina would result in a Chinese attack
in Korea, and that investing in places like Vietnam would be “playing the enemy’s game-getting
ourselves involved in brushfire wars in Burma, Afghanistan, and God knows where.” 161 Stassen
replied that brushfire wars in the future could be avoided by making it clear that general war
would result from any Communist intrusion into any part of the world not currently under their
control. For Stassen, the only war would then be in Indochina, where, as it already had
communists in it, such a policy would be inapplicable. Eisenhower had already laid out his
thinking on this subject outside the Council. On April 26 he had written to his friend (and
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) Al Gruenther, in which Eisenhower observed that the
loss of Dien Bien Phu was not necessarily the end of the war in Indochina, and that a concert of
nations in the area, such as NATO, would be best, as then, “we possibly wouldn’t have to
fight.” 162 With his thinking already laid out, Eisenhower was unlikely to change his mind unless
he heard a convincing argument against those points. While Eisenhower listened to Stassen and
allowed him to have his say, in the end he told the council that intervention with ground forces
would not be deployed unilaterally, and that the United States policy without the British would
be to continue to organize regional defense and await the return and report of Dulles on the
diplomatic situation. 163
After the decisions of April 6 and April 29 in the Council, there was little to do but to
wait for Dien Bien Phu to fall and try to minimize the damage. Cutler sent Smith a letter,
discussing the general situation and the possible use of “new weapons,” i.e. nuclear weapons, but
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nothing would ever come of it. 164 Dulles returned to the White House May 5 and, after
discussing the situation at length, agreed that the “conditions [in Indochina] do not justify U.S
entry into Indochina as a belligerent at this time.” 165 At the next day’s NSC meeting, Dulles
shared that assessment with the Council members. They agreed to accept a British proposal of
organizing a five power staff agency consisting of the U.S., Britain, France, Australia, and New
Zealand, to see to the defense of Southeast Asia. This would be supplementary to continued
efforts to form a regional grouping. Allen Dulles’s intelligence report made it clear that Dien
Bien Phu was in its death throes. 166 The next day, Dien Bien Phu surrendered, after suffering
immensely since the beginning of March. Thousands of French soldiers had perished, and
thousands more would die in enemy captivity. The Vietminh had accepted staggering casualties
to win their political victory. The next day, the NSC would focus on the defense of the Tonkin
delta at the 196th NSC meeting, while also focusing on preserving the EDC, which would
eventually fail, and convincing France into internationalizing the conflict. 167 The next battle that
was shaping up would be a diplomatic one at Geneva, where the State Department would take a
lead on trying salvage the situation. Eisenhower ordered further study for Indochinese
intervention, looking at economic warfare plans, U.N intervention, and independence for the
Associated States, but ultimately concluded, with Dulles, that the U.S. simply could not do it
alone. 168
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In the first five weeks after Dien Bien Phu, intervention appeared on the surface to be an
option, with Eisenhower and Dulles even going so far as to draft a Congressional resolution for
intervention. However, as negotiations dragged on, a final agreement was reached in July of
1954 which partitioned the country into North and South Vietnam, provided for the withdrawal
of the French, and set elections for 1956 to reunify the country. While denounced at home for
being a concession, it was in some ways pleasing to the Eisenhower administration. South
Vietnam could be built into a bulwark against communism, while French colonialism would
hopefully no longer be the troublesome issue that it had been. 169 The Eisenhower administration
found a leader in Ngo Dinh Diem, though its man on location, Joe Collins, reported that he
doubted Diem’s capacity to lead the country. Nevertheless, Diem remained in power, and Collins
focused on trying to address Vietnam’s modernization needs. 170 Dillon Anderson, who became
Eisenhower’s second Special Assistant for National Security in 1955, explained that the decision
was made to insure stability. “[Eisenhower] was the one who made the decision to recognize and
back Diem. . . . I knew how he felt about getting into a land war out there . . . he wasn’t going to
do it there or anywhere else on the continent of Asia.” 171 Anderson would leave his position after
a year, but would be a member of a commission sent to evaluate the Mutual Aid programs the
U.S. established in Southeast Asia, thereby fulfilling Cutler’s idea of having outside groups
conduct the study of operations to provide fresh perspective. While suggesting some personal
misgivings about economic aid, Dillon’s report on Vietnam was upbeat. South Vietnam was, “a
nation acknowledged to be the Free World’s strong anchor on the Southeast Asia Mainland,” and
that the process of equipping and training indigenous forces continued, and that aid would be
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required for Vietnam to be fully independent. 172 The United States was preparing to be in
Vietnam as long as it needed to be in a supporting role.
During the crisis at Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower’s National Security Council played an
important part in Eisenhower deliberations, but was augmented by the ad hoc and informal
means of advice that Eisenhower created or sought out. After the April 6th meeting of the NSC,
unilateral intervention was taken off the table due a combination of factors. The Special Annex,
with its warnings on the effect that committing ground forces would have on the U.S. defense
posture reinforced Eisenhower’s own fears of ground troops in Vietnam being absorbed “by
divisions.” His discussions with Dulles indicated that both men were at least wary of Indochina.
By the time of the April 1 NSC meeting, Eisenhower knew when Radford urged air intervention
that the rest of the Joint Chiefs were not in agreement. With unilateral intervention discarded, the
focus turned to multilateral efforts. After those failed to find support, there was no real attempt
to organize unilateral intervention again except for Harold Stassen’s vehement arguments. It has
been suggested that Eisenhower never intended for multilateral intervention to work, but he
wanted the British to take the blame for non-intervention. Nixon noted in his memoirs that,
“[Eisenhower] seemed resigned to doing nothing at all unless we could get allies . . . and he did
not seem inclined to put much pressure on to get them to come along.” 173 The British certainly
felt that blame was being shifted onto them. 174 Some Eisenhower revisionists, such as Melanie
Billings-Yun, conclude that, “[Eisenhower] succeeded in laying the blame on America’s allies,
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particularly Britain, for his decision not to intervene in Indochina prior to the Geneva
conference. 175
It appears that Dulles desired the option of multilateral intervention. His sister recounted
that, after having thought he had worked out some negotiation with the British, Dulles claimed
that “Eden had double-crossed me. He lied to me . . . about our intervening in Indochina,” once
that option fell through. 176 Like Dulles, Eisenhower may have wanted to retain the possibility of
multilateral intervention, at least to stave off Indochina’s fall, ideally without any direct action.
Eisenhower liked to have options, and if it came down to an emergency, he would have
preferred, no doubt, to have the British-U.S. intervention as an option. As he made clear to
Gruenther, Eisenhower thought the very possibility of multilateral intervention might prevent its
necessity. He and Dulles, in their discussions, did seem personally frustrated with the French and
the British lack of cooperation. 177 Eisenhower’s openness to various possibilities, the continued
efforts at international cooperation, his agreement to the five power staff for Indochina, and his
rebuke of Radford for scaring the British off would indicate that he did want the option of
intervention with the British. If not, than he was certainly keeping his cards close to his chest. As
Greenstein and Burke note, however, Eisenhower’s innermost thoughts “are bound to be
elusive.” 178
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With the greater revisionism accompanying Eisenhower, his decision to avoid
involvement in Vietnam has drawn much applause in light of later U.S. difficulties there. Some
scholars, however, consider Eisenhower’s administration the father of the Vietnam War.
Summarizing the latter view, Robert McMahon explains that,
The Eisenhower administration grievously misunderstood and underestimated the most
significant historical development of the mid-twentieth century-the Force of Third-World
Nationalism. This failure of perception . . . constituted a major setback for American
diplomacy. 179

George Herring clearly falls into a less appreciative camp, noting that in the case of South
Vietnam, “had it looked all over the world, the United States could not have chosen a less likely
place for an experiment in nation building.” 180 Herring further argues that, “lacking an acute
knowledge of Vietnamese culture and history . . . the Americans seriously underestimated the
difficulties of nation-building in an area without any real basis for nationhood.” 181 The
Eisenhower administration entered the White House, “confident that new methods or the more
persistent application of old ones could turn a deteriorating situation around.” 182 When the
United States allowed Diem to cancel the election to reunite Vietnam in 1956, the Eisenhower
administration, according to Richard Immerman, “signaled that diplomacy- and international
law- were not substitutes for force. Soon it would find itself trapped by its own logic in
summoning that force.” 183 Edward Cuddy argues that Eisenhower played, “arguably the most
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crucial role of all presidents,” in U.S. involvement in Vietnam, arguing that SEATO was a “toxic
blend of cold war ideology and distorted history.” 184
These scholars present strong cases, especially regarding the misunderstanding of third
world nationalism. Eisenhower’s whole policy apparatus supported a continuation of arming
indigenous forces and fostering Vietnamese nationalism, convinced that the strategy that had
been tried since the Truman administration would succeed as long as it was done right, ignoring
the reality that the nationalists were fighting for the Vietminh. Even recognizing that there was
no strong, unifying figure as was found in Korea, Eisenhower hoped that a policy of what would
be known as Vietnamization would succeed in preventing the necessity of direct U.S.
intervention. However, even if he clearly misunderstood third world nationalism, he was
resolutely anti-colonial. He and the whole NSC were frustrated by French Colonialism.
Eisenhower did not want to engage in a war in Vietnam. While he tried to build an indigenous
force, he never committed U.S. ground troops in actual combat that would tie the U.S. to
Vietnam irrevocably and require outright victory. He had come to the conclusion in the National
Security Council, based on the advice he received and his own observations that Indochina could
fall without taking all of Southeast Asia with it. Dillon Anderson would note that
Eisenhower never let one of those things [like Vietnam] get to the point where we had
ourselves committed to an outright confrontation . . . he never let our national commitments get
to a point where we couldn’t distance it. . . . He tempered our action with what we could do
successfully. 185

Whether or not he created a situation in which future presidents could become entangled in the
maw of Vietnam will be always be a debatable point. Eisenhower, however, avoided committing
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the U.S. to Vietnam and it seems unlikely that he would have deployed actual combat forces, due
to his thoughts dating back to the beginning of the Indochinese crisis.
The example of Dien Bien Phu provides a look into the National Security Council in its
early days. It was still finding its exact tone. Eisenhower was occasionally unhappy with the
Planning Board. The OCB was not used in any meaningful way, and would not even be part of
the NSC for another four years. It did not lead to immediately decisive solutions. Frequently
during Dien Bien Phu, matters were tabled until the next session. Eisenhower in general was,
“not characterized by the rapid, decisive decision-making style of less complex leaders like
Truman and Lyndon Johnson.” 186 Immerman and Herring argue that the NSC was of peripheral
importance to the decisions at Dien Bien Phu and “lagged behind the unfolding events in
Indochina.” 187 Eisenhower, after all, made his important decisions outside the Council, such as
reaching the determination that ground forces would not be needed and that the British would
have to support any intervention. However, those decisions themselves were made in the context
of informal advice, previous NSC meetings, and NSC policy papers spelling out his alternatives,
such as the Special Annex warning of the effect intervention would have on America’s
manpower reserves. Eisenhower was able to use what he needed from the NSC, and he set up
other methods of gathering advice and information, either from ad hoc groups or his personal
communications, when he felt he needed it. In particular, private meetings with Dulles had a
great individual effect on policy.
In the end, the NSC, despite some of its difficulties, would prove a vital forum in which
Eisenhower would make decisions; even when ideas were already formulated, he tested them
with the Council, not letting them know his own thoughts. His desire to have the meetings so
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regularly in the first place and his continuation of those meetings indicated that he placed great
value on the Council’s uncolored opinions. The Planning Board provided plans that were the
basis of discussion both in and out of Council. It was ultimately a formal mechanism that
Eisenhower used that could be allowed adaptability and did not restrict debate or information. It
was also not a rule by committee. Eisenhower decided matters for himself, but did so after
receiving the best advice he could from the relevant members of the Council. Even if he
disagreed with a Council member, as was the case with Stassen, he engaged in vigorous debate,
defended his position and listened carefully to others. The NSC was helpful in anticipating
consequences and acting for the best benefit of the United States. Robert Cutler, testifying before
the Jackson Subcommittee after Eisenhower left office, told the Congress, “to give a President a
tool he can use for his own use is the reason why the National Security Act seems to me a major
triumph of our national legislature.” 188 For Cutler, it could be called a triumph because he felt
that Eisenhower’s NSC had in its eight years contributed greatly to Eisenhower’s efforts to form
intelligent national security policy to challenges like those posed in Vietnam. In the end, while
heavily invested in Vietnam, before and after Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower’s formal and informal
channels of communication convinced him both that commitment to Dien Bien Phu would
negatively impact the United States, and that Indochina was not an area which the U.S.
absolutely had to defend to prevent Southeast Asia’s fall to communism. As such, he decided to
avoid coming to a point in which the U.S. would be committed to war. While not perfect, and not
the exclusive foundation of advice by any means, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s National Security
Council played a vital role in providing well thought out policy for the United States during
Eisenhower’s administration.
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